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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 [T]he School District was well aware of Mr. Doe’s history. In-
deed, Mr. Doe’s mother had specifically cautioned the teachers and 
the principal of the need to keep a watchful eye on him. . . . Some-
time in November, Mr. Doe took Ms. Jones to a secluded area and 
sexually assaulted her. Ms. Jones, who was menstruating at the 
time, bled and vomited during the course of the assault and bat-
tery. Upon discovering Mr. Doe and Ms. Jones, a janitor told them 
to clean up the mess, returned them to class, and advised the 
teachers where he had found them. . . . [T]he teachers had tied 
other clothing around her waist to hide it, but [her mother] was 
never . . . informed of any of the circumstances leading to the soil-
ing of Ms. Jones’ clothing. . . . The teachers told Ms. Jones not to 
tell her mother about the incident and encouraged her to forget it 
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had happened at all. . . . Because of these incidents and because 
she had begun to engage in self-destructive and suicidal behavior, 
Ms. Jones left school and entered a psychiatric hospital. . . . Fol-
lowing her release from the hospital, Ms. Jones attempted to re-
turn to school . . . but stayed for only one day because she was once 
again battered by Mr. Doe and ridiculed by other students for Mr. 
Doe’s earlier sexual attacks on her.1 
 Following the 1999 United States Supreme Court decision in 
Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education,2 Verna Williams, lead 
counsel for the plaintiff, wrote that Davis “is a wake-up call to the 
nation’s educational institutions—elementary, secondary, and post-
secondary alike—to make sure that they take seriously complaints 
about a student’s sexual harassment by a peer.”3 Ms. Williams suc-
ceeded in convincing the Court that educational institutions should 
be required to pay damages under Title IX of the Education Amend-
ments of 1972 “if they turn their backs when students harass one an-
other sexually.”4 While students were previously granted the right to 
seek damages against educational institutions if sexually harassed 
by a teacher,5 Davis was the first case in which the Court extended 
this right under Title IX to students sexually harassed by their fellow 
classmates.6 
 Like Ms. Williams, many women’s rights advocates declared a vic-
tory for young women as Davis appeared to finally acknowledge that 
students in federally funded educational institutions deserve protec-
tion and relief from sexual harassment.7 This victory seemed much 
needed, particularly after the American Association of University 
Women announced in 1993 that eighty-five percent of all female stu-
dents experienced some form of sexual harassment, with sixty-five 
percent being harassed in the classroom, and seventy-three percent 
being harassed in their school hallways.8 The Davis decision ap-
peared to give federally funded educational institutions the motiva-
                                                                                                                    
 1. Murrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 186 F.3d 1238, 1243-44 (10th Cir. 1999). Murrell is one 
of two successful Title IX peer sexual harassment claims to date and demonstrates the 
level of severity the harassment must reach to be considered actionable sex discrimination 
under Title IX. 
 2. 526 U.S. 629 (1999). 
 3. Verna Williams, A New Harassment Ruling: Implications for Colleges, 45 CHRON. 
HIGHER EDUC. 41, A56 (1999). 
 4. Id. 
 5. See, e.g., Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998); Franklin v. 
Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60 (1992). 
 6. 526 U.S. at 643. 
 7. EQUAL RIGHTS ADVOCATES: A WOMAN’S LAW CTR., SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN 
SCHOOLS, available at www.equalrights.org/sexhar/school/sh-scho.htm [hereinafter ERA] 
(last viewed Aug. 24, 2002) (on file with author).   
 8. AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN EDUC. FOUND., HOSTILE HALLWAYS: THE AAUW 
SURVEY ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN AMERICA’S SCHOOLS (1993) [hereinafter AAUW]. 
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tion needed to adopt effective policies to protect students from the po-
tentially debilitating effects of sexual harassment.9  
 However, the majority opinion in Davis, written by Justice 
O’Connor, sets forth a standard under which students have had diffi-
culty winning their Title IX peer sexual harassment claims.10 While 
reiterating the Court’s rejection of the use of agency principles,11 Jus-
tice O’Connor concluded that federally funded educational institu-
tions must have actual notice of, and act deliberately indifferent to, 
sexual harassment “that is so severe, pervasive, and objectively of-
fensive that it can be said to deprive the victims of access to the edu-
cational opportunities or benefits provided by the school.”12 O’Connor 
stated that the notice requirement “cabins the range of misconduct 
that the statute proscribes”13 and that all of the required factors un-
der this new standard “combine to limit a recipient’s damages liabil-
ity to circumstances wherein the recipient exercises substantial con-
trol over both the harasser and the context in which the known har-
assment occurs.”14 While the symbolic significance of granting stu-
dents the ability to be awarded monetary damages for being sub-
jected to sexual harassment is great, the practical reality is that the 
federal circuit courts have been careful to construe O’Connor’s stan-
dard narrowly, thus dismissing many students’ Title IX claims even 
though they have been subjected to what should amount to action-
able sexual harassment. Distillations of the Davis standard vary 
from circuit to circuit, and questions remain unanswered as to the 
level of control required, the form of actual notice needed to trigger 
deliberate indifference, and the extremity of post-notice harassment 
needed to show that an educational institution has been deliberately 
indifferent. 
 In this Comment, I consider how the federal circuit courts have 
reacted to the Davis decision and discuss whether the lower courts 
have consistently applied and interpreted the Davis standard. Spe-
cifically, I discuss in Part II the evolution leading to the Davis deci-
sion through which a cause of action has been recognized under Title 
IX for peer sexual harassment. In Part III, I discuss the standard 
arising from Davis. In Part IV, I provide a comparative analysis of 
the federal circuit court decisions applying the Davis standard. In 
Part V, I conclude by discussing several questions Davis left unre-
                                                                                                                    
 9. 526 U.S. 629 (1999). 
 10. Id. at 650.  
 11. Id. at 642; see also Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 283 
(1998). 
 12. Davis, 526 U.S. at 650. 
 13. Id. at 644. 
 14. Id. at 645. 
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solved that have led to the federal circuit courts’ conservatively con-
struing O’Connor’s Davis standard. 
II.   RECOGNIZING A CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER TITLE IX15 FOR SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT OF STUDENTS IN FEDERALLY FUNDED EDUCATIONAL 
INSTITUTIONS 
A.   Legislative Intent of Title IX 
 Legal questions regarding the applicability of Title VII to protect 
students in federally funded educational institutions from discrimi-
nation were mooted when Congress passed Title IX of the Education 
Amendments of 1972 (Title IX).16 Congress crafted Title IX broadly 
with the intention of reaching all forms of sexual discrimination 
within the control of a school, as it states, “No person in the United 
States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be 
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any 
education program or activity receiving Federal financial assis-
tance.”17 Senator Birch Bayh, the congressional sponsor of the 
amendment, “recognized that discrimination can result from a 
school’s attitude, as well as its actions, toward women”18 and stated 
that “one of the great failings of the American educational system is 
the continuation of corrosive and unjustified discrimination against 
women.”19  
 Title IX forms the basis for student complaints of sexual harass-
ment by a member of his or her educational community.20 The Office 
for Civil Rights (OCR), which provides support to the United States 
Department of Education, is responsible for enforcing Title IX and 
other federal statutes that prohibit discrimination in education pro-
grams and activities receiving federal financial assistance.21 The 
OCR offers guidelines entitled, “Sexual Harassment Guidance: Har-
assment of Students by School Employees, Other Students, or Third 
Parties”22 and maintains the belief that “[w]hen a school makes it 
clear that sexual harassment will not be tolerated, trains its staff, 
                                                                                                                    
 15. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. § 1681(a). 
 18. Daniel G. McBride, Guidance for Student Peer Sexual Harassment? Not!, 50 STAN. 
L. REV. 523, 535 (1998). 
 19. 118 CONG. REC. 5,803 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh). 
 20. See, e.g., Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999); Gebser v. 
Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998); Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 
503 U.S. 60 (1992).  
 21. See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE: HARASSMENT OF 
STUDENTS BY SCHOOL EMPLOYEES, OTHER STUDENTS, OR THIRD PARTIES, 62 Fed. Reg. 
12,034 (Mar. 13, 1997). 
 22. Id. 
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and appropriately responds when harassment occurs, students will 
see the school as a safe place where everyone can learn.”23  
 However, in one Title IX lawsuit, the Court applied a narrow 
reading of Title IX’s enforcement ability.24 The Court found that the 
only enforcement mechanism for Title IX was the termination of fed-
eral money to the discriminatory institution.25 Because this enforce-
ment mechanism only reached the specific program or activity receiv-
ing funds and not the entire institution, the Court ruled that Title IX 
could only apply to specific programs or activities receiving federal 
funds.26 To clarify the purpose of Title IX after this “unacceptable de-
cision,”27 Congress passed the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 “to 
restore the prior consistent and long-standing executive branch in-
terpretation and broad, institution-wide application” of certain civil 
rights laws, including Title IX.28  
B.   Progression of Case History Leading to Davis v.  
Monroe County Board of Education 
 Although the language of Title IX does not expressly provide a 
private cause of action for student victims of sexual harassment, in 
Cannon v. University of Chicago the Court found that Title IX was 
sufficiently broad in nature to include an implied private right of ac-
tion for victims.29 Subsequently, the Court held in Franklin v. Gwin-
nett County Public Schools that private plaintiffs could receive mone-
tary damages for sexual harassment under Title IX.30 The Franklin 
Court extended the theories of the traditional line of Title VII sexual 
harassment cases31 to faculty-on-student harassment, reiterating 
that sexual harassment is sex discrimination; “when a supervisor 
sexually harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate’s sex, 
that supervisor ‘discriminate[s]’ on the basis of sex.”32 The Franklin 
Court ruled that the sexual harassment of a student by a teacher (or 
other agent of the school) is considered quid pro quo sexual harass-
ment, a form of sex discrimination prohibited under Title IX.33 But as 
recently as 1998, the United States Supreme Court “clarified” the 
                                                                                                                    
 23. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, SEXUAL HARASSMENT: IT’S NOT ACADEMIC, available at 
http://www.ed.gov/offices/OCR/ocrshpam.html (last modified Mar. 21, 2002). 
 24. See Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 573-74 (1984). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 73 (1992) (explaining Con-
gress’s interpretation of the Supreme Court’s decision in Grove). 
 28. Pub. L. No. 100-259, § 2, 102 Stat. 28 (1988) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1687-88 
(1994)). 
 29. 441 U.S. 677, 709 (1979). 
 30. 503 U.S. at 76. 
 31. See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S 57 (1986). 
 32. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 75 (quoting Vinson, 477 U.S at 64). 
 33. Id. 
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standard for holding schools liable for damages under Title IX for 
sexual harassment of a student by a teacher in Gebser v. Lago Vista 
Independent School District.34 The Court held that schools are liable 
for damages when a school official with authority to take corrective 
action actually knew about the sexual harassment and acted with de-
liberate indifference.35 
 Peer sexual harassment is the most common form of sexual har-
assment in schools, with over eighty percent of students who are 
sexually harassed reporting that a peer had sexually harassed 
them.36 The number of allegations of peer sexual harassment has 
steadily increased throughout the last decade.37 However, determin-
ing liability for student-on-student sexual harassment has been a 
comparatively arduous journey as determining standards of liability 
for workplace sexual harassment. Before Davis, numerous conflicting 
lower court decisions made the discussion of school liability for peer 
sexual harassment ripe for United States Supreme Court review. 
Such conflicts primarily stemmed from defining the appropriate 
standards for notice, authority, and responsibility.38  
 As early as 1993, the Ninth Circuit heard the first case of student-
on-student sexual harassment in Doe v. Petaluma.39 Jane Doe, a 
middle-school student in Petaluma, was subjected to sexually harass-
ing remarks and behavior for many months by her peers.40 Doe re-
ported the harassment to school officials, who promised to end the 
harassment but failed to do so.41 Nor did any school officials inform 
Doe or her parents of her rights under Title IX.42 In 1995, the Doe 
court theorized that Title VII principles might be applied in deter-
mining if a school had notice of peer harassment and failed to take 
appropriate corrective action.43  
 However, cases that followed would further confound, rather than 
clarify, liability standards for schools faced with student-on-student 
sexual harassment claims. In Burrow v. Postville Community School 
District, one federal district court determined that a student may 
bring a Title IX cause of action against a school for its knowing fail-
ure to take appropriate remedial action in response to the hostile en-
vironment created by students at the school.44 In the same year, the 
                                                                                                                    
 34. 524 U.S. 274 (1998). 
 35. Id. at 292-93. 
 36. AAUW, supra note 8. 
 37. ERA, supra note 7. 
 38. 526 U.S. 629 (1999). 
 39. 54 F.3d 1447 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 40. Id. at 1449. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id.  
 43. Id. at 1452. 
 44. 929 F. Supp. 1193, 1205 (N.D. Iowa 1996). 
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Fifth Circuit ruled in Rowinsky v. Bryan Independent School District 
that a school district should not be held liable for peer sexual har-
assment under Title IX unless the funding recipient directly commit-
ted the sexual harassment or the school district treated the sexual 
harassment of one gender more seriously than the sexual harass-
ment of the other.45 The Eleventh Circuit in Davis v. Monroe County 
Board of Education affirmed the district court’s decision to dismiss 
Davis’s claim on the ground that Title IX provides no private cause of 
action for peer sexual harassment.46 This disagreement over the na-
ture of school liability under Title IX gave the United States Su-
preme Court an opportunity to break the stalemate. 
III.   THE DAVIS DECISION 
 The United States Supreme Court chose to address the issue of 
peer sexual harassment in the case of Davis v. Monroe County Board 
of Education.47 As set forth in the complaint, a classmate of fifth-
grader LaShonda Davis had subjected her to fondling, offensive 
comments, and abusive actions over a five-month period.48 During 
that time, LaShonda’s mother pleaded for help from school officials, 
but no meaningful action followed.49 One teacher allegedly refused, 
for more than three months, to allow LaShonda to change her as-
signed seat away from her tormentor.50 The school lacked a sexual 
harassment policy and procedure that could have helped LaShonda 
find a way to remedy the sexual harassment.51 Eventually, 
LaShonda’s mother filed a criminal complaint against the harasser 
and filed suit against the school district.52 The harasser pleaded 
guilty to the criminal charge and finally, the harassment ceased.53 
 In its Davis ruling, the Court followed the progression of most 
lower courts and decided against the view of the Fifth Circuit. The 
Court found that just as Title VII is violated if a sexually hostile 
working environment is created by co-workers and tolerated by the 
employer, Title IX is violated if a fellow student creates a sexually 
hostile educational environment and the supervising authorities 
knowingly fail to act to eliminate the harassment.54 
                                                                                                                    
 45. 80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 46. 120 F.3d 1390, 1406 (11th Cir. 1997), rev’d and remanded, 526 U.S. 629 (1999). 
 47. 526 U.S. 629 (1999). 
 48. Id. at 633 (in reviewing the legal sufficiency of the cause of action, the Court “‘as-
sume[d] the truth of the material facts as set forth in the complaint’”) (quoting FED. R. CIV. 
P. 12(b)(6)). 
 49. Id. at 633-34. 
 50. Id. at 635. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id.  
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 647. 
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 The Davis ruling did not surprise the OCR. When the OCR issued 
its guidelines on the sexual harassment of students in March of 1997, 
it suggested that peer sexual harassment should be actionable under 
Title IX.55 The OCR criticized the Fifth Circuit as the odd-man-out in 
its deviation from other federal courts on the subject of school liabil-
ity for student-on-student sexual harassment.56 The Fifth Circuit de-
termined in Rowinsky v. Bryan Independent School District that a 
school district is not liable under Title IX for peer harassment unless 
the school district itself directly discriminates based on sex by re-
sponding differently to similar claims of sexual harassment by girls 
versus boys.57 The OCR and, ultimately, the United States Supreme 
Court believed that this decision was a misapplication of Title IX, as 
the OCR explained: 
Title IX does not make a school responsible for the actions of the 
harassing student, but rather for its own discrimination in failing 
to take immediate and appropriate steps to remedy the hostile en-
vironment once a school official knows about it. If a student is 
sexually harassed by a fellow student, and a school official knows 
about it, but does not stop it, the school is permitting an atmos-
phere of sexual discrimination to permeate the educational pro-
gram. The school is liable for its own action, or lack of action, in 
response to this discrimination. Notably, Title VII cases that hold 
that employers are responsible for remedying hostile environment 
harassment of one worker by a co-worker apply this same stan-
dard.58  
 In Davis, the United States Supreme Court did not, however, ig-
nore the potential for the courts to be flooded with peer sexual har-
assment cases.59 The growing body of research at that time showed 
that student-on-student sexual harassment was rampant in educa-
tional institutional settings, particularly in America’s colleges and 
universities.60 The Court thus narrowed the circumstances in which 
schools can be held liable and what actions constitute sex discrimina-
tion under Title IX. Justice O’Connor, writing for the majority, 
stated: 
[F]unding recipients are properly held liable in damages only 
where they are deliberately indifferent to sexual harassment, of 
                                                                                                                    
 55. See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE: HARASSMENT OF 
STUDENTS BY SCHOOL EMPLOYEES, OTHER STUDENTS, OR THIRD PARTIES, 62 Fed. Reg. 
12,034 (Mar. 13, 1997). 
 56. Id. 
 57. 80 F.3d 1006, 1016 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 58. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE: HARASSMENT OF STU-
DENTS BY SCHOOL EMPLOYEES, OTHER STUDENTS, OR THIRD PARTIES, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,048 
(Mar. 13, 1997). 
 59. 526 U.S. at 648. 
 60. Id. 
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which they have actual knowledge, that is so severe, pervasive, 
and objectively offensive that it can be said to deprive the victims 
of access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by 
the school.61  
While Justice O’Connor narrowed the circumstances in which har-
assment may be actionable, it is clear that this ruling applies to all 
levels of education, including institutions of higher learning: 
“[R]ecipients of federal funding may be liable for ‘subject[ing]’ their 
students to discrimination where the recipient is deliberately indif-
ferent to known acts of student-on-student sexual harassment and 
the harasser is under the school’s disciplinary authority.”62  
 Thus, women’s advocacy organizations had their victory: a recog-
nized right under Title IX for student victims of peer sexual harass-
ment to sue schools and districts that fail to respond to sex discrimi-
nation occurring under their noses.63 However, a carefully crafted 
standard was carved into the woodwork of Davis that so narrows the 
range of actionable conduct that only some victims are able to realize 
fully their after-the-fact right to be free from sexual harassment. The 
Davis holding can hardly be said to be a victory for student victims of 
sexual harassment, when the only victims who succeed under Davis 
are students utterly debilitated by the harassment. Davis does not 
equal the right to be free from sexual harassment, nor is Davis an ef-
fective tool to motivate educational institutions to participate in the 
effort to eliminate sexual harassment in our schools. Rather, Davis 
has been the glue that has held the educational status quo of general 
indifference in place. 
A.   The Actionable Right 
 The language of Title IX is short and sweet: “No person in the 
United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participa-
tion in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination 
under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance.”64 Congress included an enforcement provision that em-
powered federal programs offering financial assistance to use “any . . 
. means authorized by law” to fulfill the congressional intent of Title 
IX.65  
 While the Court could have concluded that Title IX only bestows a 
federal right to terminate funds to a funding recipient in response to 
a violation of Title IX, the Court has interpreted the “any means” 
                                                                                                                    
 61. Id. at 650. 
 62. Id. at 646-47. 
 63. ERA, supra note 7. 
 64. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000). 
 65. Id. § 1682. 
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provision as allowing the termination of funding as just one possible 
option. The Court has not, however, chosen to limit the federal gov-
ernment’s power to enforce Title IX solely through the termination of 
funding.66 The Court justified its broader interpretation of Title IX by 
comparing the language in Title IX to the similar language in Title 
VI.67 Because the Court had already recognized an implied right of 
action in Title VI prior to congressional adoption of Title IX, it was 
appropriate to determine that Congress intended the similar lan-
guage in Title IX to bestow the same private cause of action.68 Thus, 
Franklin’s previous approval of the availability of monetary damages 
from such an action logically followed.69 
 However, this right of a private cause of action is limited by the 
power under which Congress passed Title IX.70 The Court has treated 
Title IX as legislation passed under Congress’s Spending Clause au-
thority.71 While typically Congress cannot abrogate the States’ Elev-
enth Amendment immunity under the Spending Clause,72 the United 
States Supreme Court has categorized Title IX funds as gifts to the 
States,73 through which States agree to waive their immunity from 
suit in exchange for the gifted funds.74  
 However, the United States Supreme Court clarified that the 
“mere receipt of federal funds cannot establish that a State has con-
sented to suit in federal court.”75 Rather, Congress must manifest “a 
clear intent to condition participation” in the federal funding “on a 
State’s consent to waive its constitutional immunity.”76 Thus, to sue 
under Spending Clause provisions, funding recipients must have ade-
quate notice that they could be liable for particular conduct. This 
contractual arrangement allows Congress to encourage certain be-
havior in exchange for federal funds, but requires Congress to “speak 
[in] a clear voice” to ensure an equal understanding of the terms of 
the agreement.77  
                                                                                                                    
 66. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677 (1979). 
 67. Id. at 694-96; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1994) (stating within Title VI: “No person in 
the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any pro-
gram or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”). 
 68. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 694-96. 
 69. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60 (1992). 
 70. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 639-40 (1999). 
 71. Id.; see U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1 for origin of Congress’s Spending Power, 
which provides in part: “The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes . . . to . . . 
provide for the . . . general Welfare of the United States.” 
 72. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996). 
 73. See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 
666, 686-87 (1999). 
 74. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1981). 
 75. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 246-47 (1985). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Halderman, 451 U.S. at 17. 
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 While the Monroe County Board of Education argued in Davis 
that school districts could not have anticipated liability stemming 
from student-on-student sexual harassment, the Court relied on its 
previous holdings in Gebser and Franklin to suggest that Title IX 
peer sexual harassment claims only seek to hold the school district 
liable for its own acts of subjecting students to sexual harassment in 
its educational programs.78 Thus, the person committing the acts of 
sexual harassment becomes less relevant (although not entirely ir-
relevant), while the reaction the school has to the student’s com-
plaint of sexual harassment becomes key.79  
B.   The Davis Standard: A Heightened Standard for Student Victims 
1.   Severe, Pervasive, and Objectively Offensive 
 The issue in Davis was not whether sexual harassment is sex dis-
crimination.80 Nor should the question have been what type of con-
duct constitutes sexual harassment.81 Rather, the issue in Davis was 
whether a recipient of federal funding for an educational program or 
activity may be held liable for damages under Title IX for sex dis-
crimination in the form of student-on-student sexual harassment.82 
The answer to this question was a no-brainer based on the Court’s 
previous line of Title IX decisions.83 
 O’Connor reaffirmed in Davis that the Court had “previously de-
termined that ‘sexual harassment’ is ‘discrimination’ in the school 
context under Title IX” when a school acts with deliberate indiffer-
ence to complaints of sexual harassment.84 The Court easily could 
have determined that the same actions sufficient to raise a hostile 
environment claim under Title VII, including demands for sexual fa-
vors, sexual advances, fondling, indecent exposure, and sexual as-
sault,85 are equally sufficient to raise a hostile environment claim 
under Title IX for student-on-student sexual harassment when these 
                                                                                                                    
 78. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 643 (1999). 
 79. Id. 
 80. The U.S. Supreme Court established that sexual harassment is a form of sex dis-
crimination in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979). 
 81. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (providing examples of sexual 
harassment that may constitute sex discrimination under Title VII). 
 82. 526 U.S. at 643. 
 83. Or at least Justice O’Connor’s opinion suggests the answer was easy. See Gebser 
v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998) (rejecting agency principles, but defin-
ing standard for school reaction using the deliberate indifference standard to determine 
whether the school subjected the student to sexual harassment after receiving notice of 
teacher-student harassment); Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 76 
(1992) (same). Of course, if Title IX serves to protect students from sex discrimination, it 
would be absurd to bar some people in the school community from engaging in such dis-
criminatory conduct but not others. 
 84. 526 U.S. at 650. 
 85. See generally Vinson, 477 U.S. 57. 
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acts are ignored by a school that has the authority and control to cor-
rect them. 
 Yet, in Davis, Justice O’Connor used the Spending Clause’s ade-
quate notice requirement to define “discrimination” in a new light. 
While admitting that the Court had “elsewhere concluded that sexual 
harassment is a form of discrimination for Title IX purposes and that 
Title IX proscribes harassment with sufficient clarity to satisfy 
Pennhurst’s notice requirement and serve as a basis for a damages 
action,”86 O’Connor went on to conclude that Title IX’s other provi-
sions “help give content to the term ‘discrimination’ in this context.”87 
At that point, she started down the path of categorizing a special 
brand of sexual harassment specifically for students in the context of 
a Title IX action.  
 Justice O’Connor explained that “[s]tudents are not only protected 
from discrimination, but also specifically shielded from being ‘ex-
cluded from participation in’ or ‘denied the benefits of’ any ‘education 
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.’”88 Her 
summary of Title IX suggests that it not only serves to protect stu-
dents generally from sexual harassment as we have come to define it 
in the massive catalogs of sexual harassment cases, but also to pro-
tect students from discriminatory conduct that would exclude or ob-
struct their access to the same educational opportunities and benefits 
that all students are free to enjoy.89 This was likely the intent of 
Congress in passing Title IX.90  
 However, O’Connor skipped over her own “not only” language to 
combine the two standards into one: Title IX only protects sex dis-
crimination that serves to bar access to educational programs and ac-
tivities. This simplification of standards ignores the portion of Title 
IX’s language that grants students the right to be free from exclusion 
from an educational program on the basis of sex or be subjected to 
discrimination under an educational program on the basis of sex.91 
Justice O’Connor stated, “[t]he statute makes clear that, whatever 
else it prohibits, students must not be denied access to educational 
benefits and opportunities on the basis of gender,”92 but neglected to 
return to the question of what else the statute prohibits. The clear 
language of the statute, in allowing for several kinds of conduct to be 
                                                                                                                    
 86. Davis, 526 U.S. at 649-50. 
 87. Id. at 650 (emphasis added). 
 88. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994)). 
 89. Id. 
 90. As Senator Bayh, the sponsor of the amendment that created Title IX, stated: 
“[Title IX] is a strong and comprehensive measure which . . . is needed if we are to provide 
women with solid legal protection as they seek education and training for later careers.” 
118 CONG. REC. 5803, 5806-07 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh). 
 91. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994). 
 92. Davis, 526 U.S. at 650 (emphasis added). 
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violative of Title IX, demonstrates Congress’s intention for Title IX to 
eliminate sexual harassment, not just sexual harassment that 
reaches such a severe level that it debilitates a student to the point of 
emotionally or physically barring access to his or her education.  
 Thus, based on this extremely narrow reading of Title IX’s prohib-
ited conduct, the Court felt the need to be “constrained to conclude 
that student-on-student sexual harassment, if sufficiently severe, can 
likewise rise to the level of discrimination actionable under the stat-
ute.”93 It is only when the sexual harassment is sufficiently severe 
that it can be said to bar access to educational opportunities and ac-
tivities that the school must become involved to correct the acts. The 
reasoning is that Title IX only prohibits the school from denying edu-
cational opportunities, programs, and activities based on sex or gen-
der. Thus, if the sexual harassment does not reach this level, it is not 
within the realm of Title IX protection.94 
 By placing the standard for the sexual harassment level of sever-
ity so high, it effectively destroys Title IX’s ability to achieve Con-
gress’s goal, while simultaneously redefining what types of sexual 
harassment constitute sex discrimination for a certain subclass of 
victims. The students that Title IX is intended to protect often have 
few options for mobility, virtually no authority to correct disruptive 
behavior on their own, and are required to attend an interactive edu-
cational institution where they must face their harassers on a daily 
basis. However, Justice O’Connor in Davis stated that although “re-
cipients may be liable for their deliberate indifference to known acts 
of peer sexual harassment . . . the dissent erroneously imagines that 
victims of peer harassment now have a Title IX right to make par-
ticular remedial demands (contemplating that victim could demand 
new desk assignment).”95  
 In the United States Supreme Court decision in Harris v. Forklift 
Systems, Inc.,96 the Court recognized the importance of defining the 
level of sexual harassment required before a victim could sue for re-
lief. The Court developed the “reasonable woman” standard to de-
termine what conduct can be actionable as “abusive work environ-
ment” harassment.97 The Court held that even where it does not “‘se-
riously affect [an employee’s] psychological well-being’ or ‘lead the 
[employee] to suffe[r] injury,’”98 conduct could be considered action-
able sexual harassment. This statement recognized that sexual har-
                                                                                                                    
 93. Id. (emphasis added).  
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 648 (citation omitted). 
 96. 510 U.S. 17, 20-23 (1993). 
 97. Id. at 20. 
 98. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991). 
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assment is unlawful under Title VII, even without evidence that the 
harassment damaged the victim’s well-being. 
 Harris involved an employee who left her employer after months 
of enduring crude remarks and propositions from the firm’s presi-
dent.99 The employer attempted to argue that because Harris had no 
physical injury, nor any evidence of psychological damage, the con-
duct was not severe and pervasive enough to affect her working con-
ditions. The Court found that the behavior the plaintiff endured 
would reasonably be harmful to women, whereas it probably would 
have been merely offensive to men and not so severe that it would af-
fect work performance.100  
 In Harris, the Court attempted to find a compromise between 
making any conduct that is merely offensive actionable and requiring 
the conduct to cause a “tangible psychological injury.”101 The Court 
found that Title VII protects an employee from having to “endure 
sexual harassment until their psychological well-being is seriously 
affected to the extent that they suffer anxiety and debilitation.”102 
Thus, the Court began to develop what later would be dubbed the 
“reasonable woman” standard, which allowed the Court to look at 
whether sexual conduct in the workplace reasonably could affect a 
woman being subjected to that type of sexual conduct. This standard 
did not rely on tangible injury but rather considered whether the 
conduct was the type that could reasonably lead a woman to suffer 
tangible injury.103 
 In Harris, the Court recognized the congressional purpose of Title 
VII was to protect employees from discrimination. However, in Davis, 
the Court forgot this important goal.104 Rather, we see schoolgirls 
having mental breakdowns from enduring daily threats, physical 
                                                                                                                    
 99. Harris, 510 U.S. at 19.  
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 21. 
 102. Id. 
 103. This standard later became referred to as the “reasonable person” standard, but 
still considers whether the conduct is the type that could lead to tangible injury for a per-
son similarly situated to the plaintiff. 
 104.  Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 652 (1999) (“The dissent fails 
to appreciate these very real limitations on a funding recipient’s liability under Title IX . . . 
we [do not] contemplate, much less hold, that a mere ‘decline in grades is enough to sur-
vive’ a motion to dismiss.”) (quoting id. at 677 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)); see Gabrielle M. 
v. Park Forest-Chic. Heights, Ill. Sch. Dist. 163, 315 F.3d 817, 828-29 (7th Cir. 2003) (Rov-
ner, J., concurring) (noting that like in the employment context, where the Supreme Court 
has “firmly rejected any requirement that the victim of harassment suffer the equivalent of 
a nervous breakdown before she can recover under a hostile environment theory . . . a hos-
tile environment should be actionable before it results in consequences so dramatic as hos-
pitalization or leaving school.”). 
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withdraw from school, and escalating suicidal tendencies.105 This can 
hardly be the optimal goal Title IX was created to achieve.106  
2.   Deliberate Indifference to Actual Notice 
 Because the Davis Court rejected the use of agency principles to 
support a claim of sex discrimination for peer sexual harassment un-
der Title IX,107 the school cannot be held liable for the independent 
acts of third parties who are not in authoritative positions capable of 
effectuating change.108 Rather, as Gebser established, an educational 
institution violates Title IX and can be liable for damages where it is 
“deliberately indifferent” to known acts of harassment.109 
 This Davis standard was borrowed directly from Gebser, where 
the Court previously determined that a student could sue under Title 
IX for a school’s deliberate indifference to known acts of harassment 
by a teacher. While the Monroe County Board of Education tried to 
argue in Davis that liability for sexual harassment by students 
rather than teachers was beyond the scope of Title IX, the Court reit-
erated its rejection of agency principles in Title IX liability.110 The 
Davis Court answered “whether the misconduct identified in Geb-
ser—deliberate indifference to known acts of harassment—amounts 
to an intentional violation of Title IX, capable of supporting a private 
damages action, when the harasser is a student rather than a 
teacher. We conclude . . . it does.”111 
 The Court explained, as had the OCR previously, that the liability 
stems not from the fact that the sexual harassment occurred, but 
rather begins when the educational institution knows that the har-
assment is occurring and fails to respond.112 Thus, the response of the 
educational institution in the face of known sexual misconduct 
                                                                                                                    
 105. See Davis, 526 U.S. 629; Vance v. Spencer County Pub. Sch. Dist., 231 F.3d 253 
(6th Cir. 2000); Murrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 186 F.3d 1238, 1243 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 106. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979) (Congress enacted Title IX 
with two principal objectives in mind: “[T]o avoid the use of federal resources to support 
discriminatory practices” and “to provide individual citizens effective protection against 
those practices.”). 
 107. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 643 (“As an initial matter, in Gebser, we expressly rejected 
the use of agency principles in the Title IX context, noting the textual difference between 
Title IX and Title VII . . . (invoking agency principles on ground that definition of ‘em-
ployer’ in Title VII includes agents of employer).”) (citations omitted).  
 108. See id. at 644 (“A recipient cannot be directly liable . . . where it lacks the author-
ity to take remedial action.”). 
 109. Id. at 643. 
 110. Id. at 640-42. 
 111. Id. at 643. 
 112. Id. at 644-45 (stating that “[i]f a funding recipient does not engage in harassment 
directly, it may not be liable for damages unless its deliberate indifference ‘subject[s]’ its 
students to harassment. That is, the deliberate indifference must, at a minimum, ‘cause 
[students] to undergo’ harassment or ‘make them liable or vulnerable’ to it.”) (quoting 
RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1415 (1966)).  
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within the control and boundaries of the school is key in determining 
whether the school caused the student to be “subjected to discrimina-
tion under any education program or activity receiving Federal fi-
nancial assistance.”113 
 For the Court to reach a determination of whether an educational 
institution acted with deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must estab-
lish that actual notice was given to the educational institution. How-
ever, unlike in Title VII sexual harassment cases, the Davis Court 
did not require that the school have a formal school policy describing 
the method of giving actual notice (to put potential victims on notice 
of their rights and obligations) or describe the form of notice re-
quired. The only standard given in Davis was that “[d]eliberate indif-
ference makes sense as a theory of direct liability under Title IX only 
where the funding recipient has some control over the alleged har-
assment. A recipient cannot be directly liable for its indifference 
where it lacks the authority to take remedial action.”114 Naturally, 
the federal circuit courts have used different methods to determine 
what this actual notice requirement means.115 
 In Davis, LaShonda Davis, the student victim, made repeated re-
ports to her classroom teacher and her mother. Upon inquiry, the 
teacher told the mother that the school principal had been informed 
of the incidents.116 No disciplinary action was taken subsequent to 
these reports. Following the reports, the sexual harassment contin-
ued.117 LaShonda reported these incidents to her physical education 
teacher. One week later, another sexually harassing incident oc-
curred under the supervision of another teacher. LaShonda reported 
it to the supervising teacher and her mother again followed up. 
Eventually, with no action even attempted by the school to curb the 
behavior toward LaShonda, the primary harasser was charged with 
and pleaded guilty to sexual battery. In the end, LaShonda was sub-
jected to five months of harassment without so much as a seat 
change made to move her away from her harasser.118 Finally, the 
harassment ceased, but only after LaShonda’s previously high grades 
had dropped and she had written a suicide note.119  
                                                                                                                    
 113. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994). 
 114. Davis, 526 U.S. at 644. 
 115. See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
 116. Davis, 526 U.S. at 633-34. The incidents at this point included peers attempting to 
touch LaShonda’s breasts and genital area and vulgar statements such as “I want to get in 
bed with you” and “I want to feel your boobs.” Id. 
 117. Id. Following the first set of reports, the sexual harassment included a student 
placing a doorstop in his pants followed by sexually suggestive mannerisms during physi-
cal education class. Id. 
 118. Id. at 635. 
 119. Id. at 634. 
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 Because there were so many attempts made by both the student 
and the mother, the Davis Court had no difficulty determining 
whether there had been actual notice. Additionally, because the com-
plaints continued over five months with the harassment ceasing only 
when the criminal justice system stepped in, it was clear that the 
school had not responded to the complaints in an effective manner. 
Nor did the school provide training on how to handle student com-
plaints of sexual harassment, have a policy for students and parents 
to follow if they needed to report sexual harassment, or have any 
personnel designated to handle sexual harassment complaints.120 
However, whether actual notice had been given becomes more diffi-
cult to determine in cases where parents fail to become involved, 
teachers fail to pass the reports on to authoritative personnel who 
have the power to make corrections, or fewer reports of harassment 
are made. 
 Once a plaintiff overcomes the hurdle of actual notice, the Davis 
Court established that the school must act with “deliberate indiffer-
ence” to that complaint for Title IX liability to attach. However, the 
phrase is amorphous. While on one hand it suggests a school must be 
responsive in the face of a sexual harassment complaint, the Court 
took a step back, explaining that “courts should refrain from second-
guessing the disciplinary decisions made by school administrators.”121 
Rather, courts should declare a school deliberately indifferent “only 
where the recipient’s response to the harassment or lack thereof is 
clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances.”122 This is 
not a reasonableness standard or a simple negligence standard. As 
Justice O’Connor explains, this standard does not actually require 
the school to “remedy” peer harassment, just to act in a manner not 
clearly unreasonable as a matter of law.123  
 This student standard is so high that Justice O’Connor expressed 
doubt regarding whether LaShonda Davis would be able to show on 
remand that the school’s response to her five months of complaints 
was “clearly unreasonable.”124 O’Connor suggested that Davis may be 
able to show that because the school failed to respond in any way 
during those five months that the school acted “clearly unreasona-
bly.” However, this twinge of doubt laid the foundation for the nearly 
impossible standard under which students could effectuate the broad 
and noble goals of Title IX.  
                                                                                                                    
 120. Id. at 635. 
 121. Id. at 648. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 648-49.  
 124. Id. at 649 (stating that “it remains to be seen whether petitioner can show that 
the Board’s response to reports of G.F.’s misconduct was clearly unreasonable in light of 
the known circumstances”). 
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IV.   COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CIRCUIT COURT DECISIONS: 
DISPARITY AMONG THE CIRCUITS 
 Since the Davis ruling in 1999, the federal circuit courts have re-
viewed numerous peer sexual harassment cases. While not exactly 
the flood of litigation of which the dissent in Davis warned, there are 
enough cases to determine that the federal circuit courts of appeal 
are not entirely comfortable with the Davis standard. Although the 
federal circuit courts understand the general test set forth in Davis, 
they are struggling to define the vague terms within the Davis test. 
Accordingly, the courts have narrowly construed the Davis standard, 
cognizant of the unanswered questions. This conservativism has re-
sulted in few winning student Title IX claims for either teacher-
student or student-on-student sexual harassment. 
 The federal circuit courts, while understanding the general Davis 
standard, still vary in their presentation of the essential elements of 
Davis liability. While some circuits focus primarily on the specifically 
enumerated Davis elements—that Title IX liability requires that 1) 
the sexual harassment be so severe, pervasive, and objectively offen-
sive that it could be said to deprive the plaintiff of access to the edu-
cational opportunities or benefits provided by the school; 2) the fund-
ing recipient had actual knowledge of the sexual harassment; and 3) 
the funding recipient was deliberately indifferent to the harass-
ment125—other circuits also include an element that the school dis-
trict must have the power to exercise substantial control over both 
the harasser and the context in which the known harassment oc-
curs.126  
 However, how the federal circuits have defined each of these ele-
ments varies widely, with several circuits commenting on the lack of 
guidance in O’Connor’s Davis opinion.127 Consequently, the courts 
have been left to search in the pages of the Davis opinion for some 
guiding light. What they have been left with is a dissent in Davis 
that warns of a barrage of litigation that will drain taxpayer dollars 
                                                                                                                    
 125. This includes the First, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits. See Vance v. Spencer 
County Pub. Sch. Dist., 231 F.3d 253 (6th Cir. 2000); Wills v. Brown Univ., 184 F.3d 20 
(1st Cir. 1999); Adusumilli v. Ill. Inst. of Tech., No. 98-3561, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 17954 
(7th Cir. July 21, 1999); Murrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 186 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 126. This includes the Eighth and Ninth Circuits. See P.H. v. The Sch. Dist. of Kan. 
City, 265 F.3d 653 (8th Cir. 2001); Reese v. Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736 (9th 
Cir. 2000). 
 127. See, e.g., P.H., 265 F.3d at 662 (“[T]he actual notice standard of Gebser has not yet 
been clearly defined.”); Murrell, 186 F.3d at 1252 (Anderson, J., concurring) (“The . . . ma-
jority wisely ‘decline[s] . . . to name job titles that would or would not adequately satisfy’ 
Davis’ requirement that the school have control over the harassing student[,] . . . leaving 
liability limited in general terms to cases involving ‘an official decision by the [Title IX] re-
cipient not to remedy the violation.’”) (quoting Davis, 526 U.S. at 642); Wills, 184 F.3d at 
31 (Lipez, J., dissenting) (“This is a vexing case for many reasons. The facts are difficult. 
The applicable law is complex and evolving . . . with . . . unruly elements . . . .”). 
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and a majority opinion that attempts to persuade readers that it is 
sufficiently narrow to combat this misconception while still offering 
relief to victims. 
A.   Severe, Pervasive, and Objectively Offensive 
 Understanding that Davis requires sexual harassment to be “so 
severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it can be said to de-
prive the victims of access to the educational opportunities or bene-
fits provided by the school,”128 the First, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth 
Circuits have attempted to determine at what threshold sexual har-
assment becomes actionable sex discrimination under Title IX. While 
always a prong that must be satisfied, other circuits stopped short of 
this severe and pervasive inquiry upon finding other prongs of the 
Davis standard were not met. However, four circuits that have ad-
dressed the severe and pervasive prong represent the continuum on 
which most peer sexual harassment cases will fall: the Seventh Cir-
cuit found the conduct was not severe enough;129 the First Circuit 
found that while the one incident of sexual harassment was severe, 
without a second incident it could not be considered to pervade the 
student’s educational environment to the point of compromising her 
educational opportunities;130 and the Sixth and Tenth Circuits found 
the conduct to be egregious enough to be considered severe, perva-
sive, and objectively offensive enough to satisfy the prong.131  
 The Seventh Circuit in Adusumilli v. Illinois Institute of Technol-
ogy132 defined the severe and pervasive requirement through the use 
of scattered narrowing terms and phrases used in the Davis majority 
opinion. It stated that actionable conduct must be “severe and re-
peated . . . and must have a systemic effect.”133 The Seventh Circuit 
went on to explain that “[s]ingle incidents of student misconduct are 
unlikely to have such an effect . . . [s]ince in each instance the con-
duct ceased as soon as it occurred, and was not repeated.”134  
 In Adusumilli, the student-plaintiff filed an action under Title IX 
for being subjected to sexual harassment on twelve separate occa-
sions by four professors and six students.135 While some of these inci-
dents were simply described by the court as “ogling” and “unwanted 
                                                                                                                    
 128. Davis, 526 U.S. at 650. 
 129. See Adusumilli, 1999 U.S. App. Lexis 17954. 
 130. See Wills, 184 F.3d 20.  
 131. See Vance v. Spencer County Pub. Sch. Dist., 231 F.3d 253 (6th Cir. 2000); 
Murrell, 186 F.3d 1238. 
 132. 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 17954, at *4. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at *1. 
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touching,”136 at least two incidents involved touching her breasts. Be-
cause the Seventh Circuit found the student had only reported two of 
the twelve incidents, the Court declined to address whether those 
unreported incidents were severe. The two incidents that were re-
ported, including the touching of her shoulder by one student and the 
touching of her breast by another student, were analyzed under the 
Davis severity prong.137  
 Because the Circuit Court refused to consider all of the incidents 
due to failure to give actual notice, the Court concluded that the two 
reported incidents were each single occurrences of isolated incidents 
that in themselves were not severe and did not permeate the stu-
dent’s educational experience with sex discrimination.138 Since there 
were no future incidents, the effect of the harassment ceased with 
the conduct, and there was no action the school needed to take.  
 Under the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of the Davis “severe 
and pervasive” requirement, after a report of sexual harassment is 
made, there must be repeated occurrences of sexual harassment by 
the same perpetrator to evidence harassment that is “severe and re-
peated” enough to cause a “systemic effect” coupled with a school that 
did nothing to keep the repeated instances from happening.139 This 
view of the severe and pervasive requirement suggests that it meas-
ures not whether the harassment in itself is objectively or subjec-
tively severe, but rather, the effect the harassment has on the stu-
dent after repeated instances.140 
                                                                                                                    
 136. Id. at *2. 
 137. Id. at *4. 
 138. Id. 
 139. See id. 
 140. Additionally, the Seventh Circuit recently went on to add that actionable conduct 
must be “so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it has a ‘concrete, negative ef-
fect’ on the victim’s access to education.” Gabrielle M. v. Park Forest-Chicago Heights, Ill. 
Sch. Dist. 163, 315 F.3d 817, 821-23 (7th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added). However, the con-
currence takes issue with the majority’s determination that “[a]lthough [Gabrielle M.] was 
diagnosed with some psychological problems, the record shows that her grades remained 
steady and her absenteeism from school did not increase. Nothing in the record shows that 
she was denied any educational opportunities by [the harassing student’s] actions.” Id. at 
823. This concurrence explains that this “view of the way in which harassment can inter-
fere with a student’s educational opportunities is too narrow . . . . Certainly at the kinder-
garten level, where learning social skills is at least as important as academic instruction, 
grades do not tell the complete story . . . in Title IX cases we have repeatedly rejected the 
notion that a victim’s ability to keep doing her job in the face of harassment will defeat her 
contention that the workplace was hostile.” Id. at 828 (Rovner, J., concurring). The concur-
rence then goes on to suggest that  
[i]f anything, courts ought to be more flexible in assessing the harms that a 
child experiences as a result of harassment, given that children (especially 
young children) are far less able to articulate the fact and extent of their inju-
ries and may manifest an array of different reactions to the harassment . . . . 
Neither she nor future victims of school place harassment should be penalized 
simply because they seem resilient. 
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 The First Circuit in Wills v. Brown University defined the Davis 
severity requirement as having a lower threshold than that of the 
Seventh Circuit.141 The First Circuit attempted to define Title IX hos-
tile environment sexual harassment in light of Title VII’s more de-
veloped standard, as the Court stated:  
The rubric ‘hostile environment[]’ applies where the acts of sexual 
harassment are sufficiently severe to interfere with the workplace 
or school opportunities normally available to the worker or student 
. . . . Broadly speaking, a hostile environment claim requires the 
victim to have been subjected to harassment severe enough to 
compromise the victim’s employment or educational opportunities . 
. . .142  
Thus, the First Circuit defined the severe and pervasive requirement 
as simply “compromising” a student’s educational opportunities, 
rather than barring or denying educational opportunities. However, 
although the First Circuit appeared to present a lower severe and 
pervasive standard for Title IX liability than Davis set forth, the stu-
dent’s claim in Wills did not survive the legal analysis actually ap-
plied in her case. 143  
 Wills sued Brown University after her chemistry teacher inappro-
priately touched her.144 Wills had approached her teacher after hav-
ing difficulty with her organic chemistry class.145 While purporting to 
pray with her in his office, the teacher pulled Wills into his lap and 
fondled her breasts under her shirt.146 Wills immediately met with 
the university official responsible for administering complaints of 
sexual harassment to report the incident.147 In response to the com-
plaint, Brown University officials placed the teacher on probation 
and issued a written reprimand warning against another such inci-
dent.148 The university did not inflict harsher punishment because 
they believed it to be the teacher’s first incident.149 They were 
wrong.150 Not only did the teacher have a string of complaints prior to 
Wills’s incident, but he continued similar behavior following the rep-
                                                                                                                    
Id. at 829. In Gabrielle M., the student victim lost her excitement for school, resisted at-
tending, lost her appetite, and began wetting her bed. Id. at 828. The concurrence appro-
priately points out that “[i]t is easy to imagine how such trauma might have interfered 
with her access to educational opportunities.” Id.   
 141. 184 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 1999). 
 142. Id. at 25-26. 
 143. Id. at 31. 
 144. Id. at 23. 
 145. Id.  
 146. Id.  
 147. Id.  
 148. Id.  
 149. Id.  
 150. Id. at 24. 
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rimand with no further action taken.151 Only two months later, 
Brown University renewed his contract for another year and 
awarded him a raise.152 
 Wills’s Title IX claim was unsuccessful because her claim “was of 
a single specific harassment incident that occurred before the repri-
mand and the later complaints (albeit one that caused continuing 
damages).”153 While Wills attempted to show that Brown University 
was subjecting her and other students to sex discrimination through 
a general indifference to continuing sexual harassment, the First 
Circuit held that subsequent reports by other students of similar 
harassment by the same teacher were not relevant.154 Rather, “ab-
sent a second physical assault by [the teacher] on Wills, or some form 
of direct harassment, Wills had no claim for sex discrimination 
against Brown occurring after [the first incident].”155  
 Yet, as the dissent in Wills pointed out, the majority failed to ap-
preciate “[t]he proposition that the presence of a harasser can rise to 
the level of hostile environment sex discrimination [which] finds 
support in the Title VII context.”156 The dissent encouraged the ma-
jority to consider adopting an objective standard of whether a stu-
dent in the plaintiff’s position “would find [the teacher’s] mere pres-
ence at [the school] created a hostile environment.”157  
 While O’Connor in Davis cautioned against lower courts finding 
schools liable for a single instance of even sufficiently severe sexual 
harassment, O’Connor limited private damages to situations “having 
a systemic effect on educational programs or activities,” not simply 
on one individual student.158 As O’Connor states, “[e]ven the dissent 
suggests that Title IX liability may arise when a funding recipient 
remains indifferent to severe, gender-based mistreatment played out 
on a ‘widespread level’ among students.”159 There is room under 
Davis for the First Circuit to have determined that Brown’s general 
attitude toward student complaints of sexual harassment by a par-
ticular teacher was enough to establish a severe permeation of sex 
discrimination throughout the program. By defeating an individual 
                                                                                                                    
 151. Id. 
 152. Id.  
 153. Id. at 26-27. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 33 (Lipez, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (describing the position 
taken by the majority of the court). 
 156. Id. at 38 (Lipez, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (referring to Ellison v. 
Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 883 (9th Cir. 1991), where an employer’s decision to allow one em-
ployee who had formerly harassed a female co-worker to transfer back into her office after 
a six-month “cooling off period,” created a hostile working environment). 
 157. Id. (creating a “reasonable female student” standard by harkening to the “reason-
able woman standard” used in Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993)). 
 158. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 653 (1999) (emphasis added). 
 159. Id.   
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student’s claim on the basis that her single instance of individual 
sexual harassment was not severe enough to result in a systemic ef-
fect on that individual, harassers can harass indefinitely, so long as 
they never harass the same student more than once. 
 The result in Wills is important because it is a Title IX teacher-
student sexual harassment claim that fails.160 Though the First Cir-
cuit has yet to decide a Title IX peer sexual harassment case, the re-
sult will likely be similarly disheartening without facts as strong as 
those found in Davis. This hypothesis finds support in Davis, as 
O’Connor explained that: 
The fact that it was a teacher who engaged in harassment in 
Franklin and Gebser is relevant. The relationship between the ha-
rasser and the victim necessarily affects the extent to which the 
misconduct can be said to breach Title IX’s guarantee of equal ac-
cess to educational benefits and to have a systemic effect on a pro-
gram or activity. Peer harassment, in particular, is less likely to 
satisfy these requirements than is teacher-student harassment.161 
 The only federal circuit courts to find peer sexual harassment se-
vere and pervasive enough to satisfy the Davis standard are the 
Sixth and Tenth Circuits. Unlike the First and Seventh Circuits, 
these courts look to the facts of Davis, rather than the terminology, 
to define what conduct can be considered severe and pervasive. In 
the cases decided to date, these circuits considered the pattern of be-
havior, its tangible effects on the student victims, and then compared 
them with Davis.  
 In Vance v. Spencer County Public School District, a student, 
Alma McGowen, experienced physical and verbal sexual torment 
over the course of several years, including being stabbed in the hand, 
being held by several classmates while others tried to rip off her 
clothes, and being subjected to continuous verbal sexual comments, 
even after a detailed complaint had been filed with the school’s Title 
IX coordinator.162 No investigation resulted, and school officials con-
tinued to use the same ineffective method of merely discussing the 
incidents with the perpetrators.163 Typically, following these discus-
sions, the sexual harassment of Alma by her classmates would esca-
late.164 
 In Murrell v. School District No. 1, a developmentally and physi-
cally disabled student, Penelope Jones, was allegedly subjected to 
sustained sexual harassment, including sexual assault and battery, 
                                                                                                                    
 160. 184 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 1999). 
 161. 526 U.S. 629, 653 (1999).  
 162. 231 F.3d 253 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 163. Id. at 256. The court seems to imply the lack of reaction may have stemmed from 
one of the perpetrators being a school board member’s son. 
 164. Id.  
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over the course of one month.165 After being warned by the assaulting 
student’s mother of his sexually aggressive tendencies and after 
teachers became aware that he was, in fact, engaging in sexually ag-
gressive behavior toward Penelope, the school allowed the harasser 
to act as a janitor’s assistant, granting him special access to unsu-
pervised areas of the school.166 It was in this capacity that he took 
Penelope to a secluded area and sexually assaulted her.167 Due to the 
escalation of the harassment, Penelope became self-destructive and 
suicidal and entered a psychiatric hospital.168 Upon her release and 
return to school, Penelope was back only one day when she was once 
again battered by her former harasser and humiliated by the other 
students who knew about the earlier sexual attacks.169  
 Similar to Davis, Vance and Murrell had a pattern of escalating 
sexual behavior committed by the same peers each time that resulted 
in a serious tangible physical effect on the student victim. In Davis, 
LaShonda’s grades had dropped and she had written a suicide 
note.170 In Vance, Alma had to complete her studies at home after be-
ing diagnosed with depression.171 In Murrell, Penelope suffered self-
destructive and suicidal tendencies necessitating entering a psychi-
atric hospital.172  
 These cases are clearly severe, and neither the Sixth nor Tenth 
Circuits had difficulty casting them as such. However, it seems odd 
that Title IX would require harassment to reach this level of extrem-
ity.173 Not only is the Harris purpose left by the wayside,174 but also 
Title IX is likely to have little impact upon schools that think nothing 
this extreme could ever happen under their control. If Title IX has 
any purpose, it must be to eradicate sex discrimination in federally 
funded educational institutions, not merely to compensate student 
victims who have been driven over the brink. For this goal to be real-
ized, the severe and pervasive standard must allow student victims 
to succeed in court without having to suffer a mental breakdown. 
This may be the only way to persuade schools to react after the very 
first complaint, before any more damage can be inflicted.  
                                                                                                                    
 165. 186 F.3d 1238, 1243 (10th Cir. 1999) (construing the facts as true to review the 
lower court’s granting of a motion to dismiss). 
 166. Id.  
 167. Id.  
 168. Id.  
 169. Id. at 1244. 
 170. 526 U.S. 629, 634 (1999). 
 171. 231 F.3d 253, 257 (6th Cir. 2000).  
 172. 186 F.3d at 1244. 
 173. Id. at 1252 (Anderson, J. concurring) (“The allegations in this case are . . . egre-
gious. . . . Whether less egregious facts will suffice in future cases remains to be seen.”). 
 174. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993) (holding that employees should not 
be made to endure sexual harassment until their psychological well-being is seriously af-
fected to the extent that they suffer anxiety and debilitation). 
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B.   Actual Notice 
 Unlike the Sixth and Tenth Circuits, where there was clear and 
ample actual notice to high-ranking school authorities, the question 
of actual notice to school officials defeated student claims in the 
Eighth and Ninth Circuits. Unlike other circuits, the Eighth and 
Ninth Circuits each focused on whether a district exercised substan-
tial control over both the harasser and the context in which the har-
assment occurred as an ancillary prong simultaneously analyzed 
with the actual notice requirement. While most circuits have not 
formally added this fourth prong to the Davis test, O’Connor did sug-
gest in Davis that “[d]eliberate indifference makes sense as a theory 
of direct liability under Title IX only where the funding recipient has 
some control over the alleged harassment. A recipient cannot be di-
rectly liable for its indifference where it lacks the authority to take 
remedial action.”175  
 The Ninth Circuit, in Reese v. Jefferson School District No. 14J, 
determined that the students suing for Title IX sexual harassment 
did not give actual notice to school officials who had the power to 
remedy the harassment.176 The students, who had already graduated, 
sued the school for ongoing harassment during high school by a 
group of male peers.177 However, the Ninth Circuit held that al-
though there may have been evidence that a teacher witnessed con-
duct that may have put the school on notice, this was not sufficient to 
establish that actual notice had been given to an official with the 
power to correct the harassment.178 Thus, the Ninth Circuit defined 
the actual notice requirement narrowly to include direct reporting to 
an official with the authority to effectuate change. While other cir-
cuits have questioned whether notice to a teacher, who either has 
limited control over the immediate conduct or can pass the informa-
tion on to an official with authority, should satisfy the actual notice 
requirement, the Ninth Circuit appears to have determined that ac-
tual notice is both a formalistic and substantive standard.  
 The Eighth Circuit has taken an even more narrow view of the 
Davis actual notice requirement. In P.H. v. School District of Kansas 
City,179 where a student sued for sex discrimination under Title IX for 
a two-year sexual relationship with a teacher, the Eighth Circuit de-
fined actual notice as an actual notice-plus standard: “a school dis-
trict must have had actual notice of a teacher’s sexual harassment of 
a student and the school district must have made an official decision 
                                                                                                                    
 175. 526 U.S. at 644. 
 176. 208 F.3d 736, 740-41 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 177. Id. at 738. 
 178. Id. at 740. 
 179. 265 F.3d 653 (8th Cir. 2001). 
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not to remedy the violation in order for liability to attach to the 
school district.”180 While P.H. argued that the actual notice standard 
had not yet been clearly defined and suggested that teachers could in 
some situations have the necessary control to take corrective action, 
the Eighth Circuit held that no constructive notice is permissible un-
der Davis; rather, the notice must be actual and to a school official.181 
 From the current case law guidance, to be successful under a Title 
IX peer sexual harassment claim there must be actual notice to an of-
ficial with the power to address the complaint. However, because 
Davis never required schools to maintain sexual harassment policies 
and reporting procedures, it is questionable whether students and 
parents will understand either their rights or their obligations under 
Davis. Additionally, it is questionable whether a student’s individual 
complaint to a teacher, the most logical person to whom a student 
would report incidents, may establish the actual notice required to 
seek damages for continued sexual harassment. Rather, students, 
regardless of age, will have to recognize that their complaints must 
be made to a high-ranking official of the school. Thus far, this person 
has been the school principal in the cases that have been success-
ful.182 The Murrell concurrence criticizes Davis, as it points to Justice 
Kennedy’s dissent, which stated: “‘[T]he majority says not one word 
about the type of school employee who must know about the harass-
ment before it is actionable.’”183 If the student is more comfortable 
discussing such matters with a teacher or guidance counselor and is 
told the situation will be corrected, but that complaint never reaches 
the principal, it is possible that even if the sexual harassment con-
tinues, the school will bear no responsibility for its inaction. This ap-
pears to be the standard irrespective of whether the principal has 
made any effort to require faculty, when a complaint is brought to 
their attention, to instruct students of their rights and responsibili-
ties and encourage the student to report the incident to the principal. 
C.   Deliberate Indifference 
 Davis defined deliberate indifference as the equivalent to not act-
ing “clearly unreasonable,”184 a phrase the courts have had to strug-
gle to define. Under the two successful circuit level student peer sex-
ual harassment Title IX claims, the phrase “deliberate indifference” 
                                                                                                                    
 180. Id. at 661. 
 181. Id. at 663. 
 182. See Murrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 186 F.3d 1238, 1252 (10th Cir. 1999) (Anderson, J., 
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 183. Id. (quoting Davis, 526 U.S. at 679 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)). 
 184. 526 U.S. at 630.  
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was defined as a two-step inquiry into 1) whether a school took any 
steps to address the complaint of sexual harassment;185 and if so, 2) 
whether the steps taken were not clearly unreasonable steps to ad-
dress the complaint of sexual harassment.186 
 However, in at least two losing Title IX student actions, the First 
and Sixth circuits only looked to whether the school took any reme-
dial steps, without considering the effectiveness or timing.187 In Wills 
v. Brown University,188 because the university took some action after 
Wills’s complaint, and because a second incident did not take place, 
the First Circuit found that the university did take action when it is-
sued the chemistry teacher a letter of reprimand and instructed him 
not to do it again or be fired.189 However, the crux of Wills’s argument 
was that the only reason this incident occurred was because the uni-
versity had failed to respond to previous students’ complaints about 
the same teacher. Had the university responded to the sexual har-
assment at that time, the teacher would not have continued to harass 
students.190 Additionally, Wills argued that because other students 
were subsequently harassed, she should be permitted to admit evi-
dence that even after her complaint, still the university acted with 
deliberate indifference to the continued sexual harassment.191 The 
First Circuit, however, held that the incidents following Wills’s com-
plaint were irrelevant as to her claim, and because no second inci-
dent occurred to her, the university’s letter of reprimand must have 
worked to protect Wills.192 
 The Sixth Circuit in Soper v. Hoben193 also held for the school dis-
trict when remedial steps were taken after the rape of a special edu-
cation student by three of her classmates at school and on the bus.194 
The Sixth Circuit in the Soper majority opinion stated that:  
[P]laintiffs have failed to present any evidence of deliberate indif-
ference attributable to defendants. Once they did learn of the inci-
                                                                                                                    
 185. See Murrell, 186 F.3d at 1248 (stating that the school “had actual knowledge . . . 
from almost the moment it began to occur, and not only refused to remedy the harassment 
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 186. See Vance v. Spencer County Pub. Sch. Dist., 231 F.3d 253, 262 (6th Cir. 2000) 
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dents, they quickly and effectively corrected the situation. Defen-
dants immediately contacted the proper authorities, investigated 
the incidents themselves, installed windows in the doors of the 
special education classroom, placed an aide in Harmala’s class-
room, and created student counseling sessions concerning how to 
function socially with the opposite sex.195 
However, as the Soper partial dissent points out, these are admirable 
steps for the school to take, but they can be considered immediately 
responsive only if the final rape is considered the lone reported inci-
dent.196 Prior to the rape, however, there were known incidents re-
ported to teachers: earlier sexual advances on the plaintiff by one of 
the boys, and the victim’s mother’s requests for the two students to 
never be left alone together unsupervised.197 Although the victim’s 
mother was assured care would be taken, “no steps were actually 
taken to minimize or stop the harassment. The specific request that 
Renee not be alone in the presence of Boy A was ignored. Arguably, 
these actions amounted to deliberate indifference to the concerns 
about harassment brought to Renee’s teachers by her mother.”198  
 The two-step process used in Murrell and Vance is superior for de-
fining the Davis deliberate indifference standard. Courts must ask 
whether any response was made following the initial complaint of 
sexual harassment, and whether that response was effective in de-
terring continued sexual harassment. Otherwise, useless remedial ef-
forts, or efforts that come too late to protect a student from seriously 
debilitating acts of sexual harassment, become a loophole through 
which schools may escape Title IX liability. 
V.   CONCLUSION: LINGERING QUESTIONS AFTER DAVIS 
 Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion in Davis sets forth a standard 
under which students have had difficulty winning their Title IX peer 
sexual harassment claims.199 While reiterating the Court’s rejection 
of the use of agency principles, O’Connor concluded that for federally 
funded educational institutions to be liable for peer sexual harass-
ment, they must have actual notice of, and act deliberately indiffer-
ent to, sexual harassment that is so severe, pervasive and objectively 
offensive that it can be said to deprive the victims of access to the 
educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school.200 
O’Connor stated that the notice requirement “cabins the range of 
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misconduct that the statute proscribes”201 and that all of the required 
factors under this new standard “combine to limit a recipient’s dam-
ages liability to circumstances wherein the recipient exercises sub-
stantial control over both the harasser and the context in which the 
known harassment occurs.”202  
 While the symbolic significance of granting students the ability to 
be awarded monetary damages for being subjected to sexual harass-
ment is great, the practical reality is that the federal circuit courts 
have been careful to construe O’Connor’s standard narrowly, con-
structing a high hurdle for students to overcome. This has led to the 
dismissal of many students’ Title IX claims even though the student 
has been subjected to what should amount to actionable sexual har-
assment.  
 Distillations of the Davis standard vary from circuit to circuit, and 
questions remain unanswered as to the form of the actual notice nec-
essary, to whom the notice must be given, and the level of control re-
quired by the school official. Additionally, courts will continue to 
struggle with determining whether one incident, even if a severe 
sexually violent act, can ever be sufficient under Davis, and whether 
the severity requirement should be viewed through a reasonable stu-
dent perspective, the eyes of the school official accepting the com-
plaint, or an objective standard based on tangible injury to the har-
assed student. How extreme post-notice harassment must be to show 
that an educational institution has acted with deliberate indifference 
remains a disturbingly high threshold, and whether the Davis stan-
dard is dependent on educational level or age remains unclear.203  
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 Until Congress defines the true nature of Title IX,204 Davis will 
continue to spawn inconsistency and subjectivity in the federal cir-
cuit courts and will continue to serve as more of an obstacle than a 
tool for student victims of sexual harassment in federally funded 
educational institutions.  
                                                                                                                    
sexual in nature, in order to support a claim of sex discrimination.” Id. at 826 (citing On-
cale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998)). Lastly, while the majority 
claimed the children lacked appreciation for the sexual conduct to be sufficiently severe, 
the court in Gabrielle M. clearly found them to be unwelcome and inappropriate, as seen 
through her manifestation of symptoms, including anxiety, bed-wetting, nightmares, and 
loss of appetite. Id. at 827.  
 204. See generally Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 573-74 (1984); Civil Rights 
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